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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-·DuE PRocEss-FEDERAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE
UsE OF CONFESSIONS IN STATE CRIM~NAL PROCEEDINGS- Undisputed evidence established that petitioner, a negro boy of .fifteen, was arrested at about
midnight, October 19, 1945 and taken to police headquarters. He was questioned by the police with no friend or counsel present. He was not informed
of his right to counsel or of his right to refuse to answer. At about .five in the
morning, October 20, he confessed. He was then informed of his rights and his
statement taken and transcribed. He was photographed by a newspaper photographer, and then placed in jail. On October 23 he was, for the .fiirst time, taken before
a magistrate and charged with murder. While the accused was in jail, prior to
arraignment but after confessing, a lawyer twice attempted to see him and was
refused ad_mittance. His mother was nof permitted to see him until October 25.
There was ample evidence for a conviction had the confession not been used.
The jury which found the confession "to be voluntary returned a verdict df
guilty. Conviction was affirmed by the court of appeals, and appeal to the
Supreme Court of Ohio was dismissed. On certiorari, held, reversed. The confession was not voluntary and its use at the trial violated the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Haley v. State, (U.S. 1948) 68 S.Ct. 302.
In determining whether the confession was voluntary, a majori_ty 1 of the
Court resolved the question solely on the basis of the undisputed evidence. In
effect, they held that as a matter of law the undisputed evidence proved the
confession was involuntary. The dissenting justices 2 insisted that to find a
violation of due process the confession must be found to be involuntary in fact,
that this required consideration of all the evidence, and that the jury verdict
controlled unless unsupported by the evidence. They concluded that the undisputed evidence did not require that this confession be found involuntary._ In
four of the cases 3 applying the due process clause to the use of confessions in
state criminal proceedings, some of the justices have voted to affirm, holding
that the confession could be found to be voluntary. They relied on much the .
same reasoning as that of the dissenting justices in this case. The justices who

1 Justice Frankfurter in a separate opinion; Justice Douglas joined by Justices
Black, Murphy and Rutledge.
2 Justice Burton joined by Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Reed and Jackson.
8 Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 62 S.Ct. 280 (1941); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 64 S.Ct. 921 (1944); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 64 S.Ct.
1208 (1944); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 65 S.Ct. 781 (1945).
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voted to reverse held that the undisputed evidence proved that the confession was
involuntary. Justice Douglas and the justices who joined in his opinion have
been relatively consistent in finding violations of due process. 4 Justices Jackson
and Reed have been as consistent in finding no violation. 5 Chief Justice Vinson 6 and Justice Burton were not on the Court when these cases were decided.
Justice Frankfurter found no violation in the first three of these cases but did in
the last. In the principal case Justice Frankfurter again found a violation. This
might indicate that there has been a shift in his attitude. The inference is
strengthened by his reasoning in each of these cases. In separate opinions, he
returns to the fundamental principles embodied in due process and bases his
decision on them. This shift would establish, in the present Court, a majority
of justices who have tended to find that confessions were involuntary. Lisenha
v; California 7 and Ashcraft v.- Tennessee 8 have set forth rough limits as to
the secret interrogation permissible for adults. The principal case sets an upper
limit for boys. Application of the time limit thus set to interrogation of adults
is made questionable by the emphasis on the age of the accused. However, in
the Lisenha case, Justices Black and Douglas. found the confession involuntary.
Justice Murphy has so found in all subsequent cases. Justice Rutledge has
found the confession involuntary in every case he has heard. Apparently, Justice Frankfurter has joined this group. Even if they are not prepared to
reverse the Lisenha case, it may be that they would find that much less than
thirty-six hours of interrogation would violate due process. 9
F. L. A damson

4 Justice Black voted to reverse in all four; Justice Rutledge heard only the last
three and voted to reverse in each; Justice Murphy voted to affirm the first, to reverse
the last three; Justice Douglas voted to affirm the third, to reverse the other three.
5 Justice Jackson voted to affirm all four; Justice Reed voted to reverse the second,
to affirni the other three.
6 "Except in those cases in which the Court was unanii:nous, his vote in every
instance was against the claim that liberty had been infringed." Fraenkel, "The Supreme Court and Civil Rights: 1946 Term," 47 CoL. L. REv. 953 at 953 (1947).
7 314 U.S. 219, 62 S.Ct. 280 (1941), (7-2).
8 322 U.S. 143, 64 S.Ct. 921 (1944), (6-3).
9 In general, see McCormick, "Some Problems and Developments in the Admissibility of Confessions," 24 TEX. L. REv. 2 39 ( 1946} ; Boskey and Pickering, "Federal
Restrictions on State Criminal Procedure," 13 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 266 (1946).

